Date of Award

9-2009

Degree Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Master of Arts (MA)

Department

Philosophy

Supervisor

Brian J. Garrett

Language

English

Abstract

This project is a response to recent criticisms against the use of intuitions in analytic philosophy, raised by adherents of experimental restrictionism. I begin by discussing and eventually rejecting the restrictionist characterization of analytic philosophy, which I take to be inaccurate and unfair. I examine several accounts of the nature of intuitions in the history of philosophy, in contemporary discourse and as they are understood by restrictionism. I reject these accounts in favour of a more modest characterization of intuitions. I conclude with an overview of the restrictionist methodology. After considering some of its past criticisms, I offer my own critique based on the restrictionists' false presupposition that intuition is a natural kind.

McMaster University Library



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