Perceptia

Delirium, Particularity, Analytics, and Abraham

Liron Taub — Fri, 02 Jul 2010 11:48:28 PDT

Near the beginning of World War I, German-Jewish philosopher Hermann Cohen wrote to American Jews asking them to try to stop America from going to war against Germany. He argued that Germany was the true homeland of the Jewish people. According to Jacques Derrida, Cohen’s argument is not merely erroneous; it exhibits a delirium. This paper analyzes why Derrida provides this diagnosis, taking for context Derrida’s thoughts on his own Judaism in ‘Abraham, the Other’. Cohen aims to combine two particular dwelling-places (Germanism and Judaism) into one single dwelling-place. Believing himself to have constructed a place, Cohen tries to call others to what is actually a non-place. In the Derridean framework, this means that Cohen tries to assume the position of God. Cohen tries to justify all of this by predicating universality to one particular. All of these attempts contravene the structure of the universe. Therefore, Cohen’s views are delirious.

Begin from Disappointment: Black Existentialism and Political Solidarity

Madeline Martin-Seaver — Fri, 02 Jul 2010 11:48:28 PDT

Through analysis and discussion of the work of Bill Lawson and Tommie Shelby, with reference to the work of Frantz Fanon, this paper discusses the link between black political solidarity and black existentialism. This paper identifies disappointment as a crucial and transformative experience to provide commonality for united action within a diverse community. Critical to the piece is the recognition that political and social forces have contributed to alienation and disappointment, and also that this apparent universality of experience does nothing to undermine the truth of black diversity. In this paper, I attempt to reconcile black existentialism with black political philosophy through examining the elements of existentialism present in the process of politicization and the development of political philosophy and solidarity.

The Role of Inconsistency in the Death of Socrates: An Analysis of Socrates' Views on Civil Disobedience and its Implications

Said Saillant — Fri, 02 Jul 2010 11:48:28 PDT

Throughout the paper, I focus on the apparent incongruity of Socrates’ views in the Apology and the Crito. In the former, Socrates claims that if acquitted on the condition that he gives up philosophizing, he will nevertheless continue to philosophize. Yet, in the latter, Socrates argues that disobeying a city ordinance is wrong because it harms the city and its laws. The inconsistency is evaluated by focusing on the purpose of each argument, i.e. the intentions (other than persuasion) for advancing the arguments. In the Crito, he argues against civil disobedience to convince Crito that escaping the death penalty is morally wrong and, therefore, an unacceptable course of action. In the Apology, he argues for civil disobedience in claiming that divine directives take precedence over civil commandments. In the latter, the underlying motive is unclear. I contend that the argument in the Crito aims to prevent civil disobedience on Socrates’ part; it serves the purpose of facilitating his death, thereby preventing disobedience in the case of acquittal and maintaining adherence to the divine injunction.