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<title>Philosophy Publications</title>
<copyright>Copyright (c) 2013 McMaster University All rights reserved.</copyright>
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<description>Recent documents in Philosophy Publications</description>
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<lastBuildDate>Wed, 22 May 2013 01:37:20 PDT</lastBuildDate>
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<title>Material Consequence and Counter-Factuals</title>
<link>http://digitalcommons.mcmaster.ca/philosophy_coll/3</link>
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<pubDate>Mon, 20 May 2013 16:20:12 PDT</pubDate>
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	<p>A conclusion is a “material consequence” of reasons if it follows necessarily from them in accordance with a valid form of argument with content. The corresponding universal generalization of the argument’s associated conditional must be true, must be a covering generalization, and must be true of counter-factual instances. But it need not be law-like. Pearl’s structural model semantics is easier to apply to such counter-factual instances than Lewis’s closest-worlds semantics, and gives intuitively correct results.</p>

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<author>David Hitchcock</author>


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